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Judges do it Better: Why Judges can
(and Should) Decide Life or Death
Andrew R. Ford*
ABSTRACT
Following its decision in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme
Court of the United States has attempted to standardize proce-
dures that states use to subject offenders to the ultimate penalty.
In practice, this attempt at standardization has divided capital
sentencing into two distinct parts:  the death eligibility decision
and the death selection decision.  The eligibility decision ad-
dresses whether the sentencer may impose the death penalty,
while the selection decision determines who among that limited
subset of eligible offenders is sentenced to death.  In Ring v. Ari-
zona, the Court held for the first time that the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial requires a jury to decide each fact necessary to
justify a death sentence.  The Court re-affirmed Ring in Hurst v.
Florida.  The Court, however, has never explicitly clarified the
proper role of judges in capital sentencing beyond death
eligibility.
This Comment takes the position that the Court’s decisions
in Ring and Hurst are narrow and only implicate the eligibility
decision.  This Comment examines the history of the Court’s
modern capital punishment jurisprudence relating to jury sen-
tencing and relevant non-capital cases that implicate the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial.  Further, this Comment argues
that judicial sentencing creates a capital sentencing structure that
is fairer, more uniform, and more harmonious with the public
policy rationales for capital punishment than sentencing by a
jury.  Finally, this Comment argues that, because juries play a
valuable role in democratizing the law, there should still be a role
for juries beyond the constitutional minimum requirement of a
jury finding aggravating circumstances or convicting a defendant
of a capital felony.
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity, 2020.  I would like to thank my parents and family for their unyielding sup-
port—even when it wasn’t warranted; Griffin Schoenbaum, Nader Amer and
Malcolm McDermond for their blunt and helpful feedback while writing this Com-
ment; Dietrich Mateschitz; and the great State of Nebraska.
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Now the jury brought in a guilty verdict
And the judge he sentenced me to death1
I. INTRODUCTION
Capital punishment is undoubtedly controversial.2  In the con-
temporary debate regarding capital punishment, much of the sur-
rounding controversy involves wrongful convictions,3 cost,4
perceived racial bias,5 inadequate assistance of counsel,6 and con-
1. BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, Nebraska, on NEBRASKA (Columbia Records 1982).
2. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2749–50 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Capital punishment presents moral questions that philosophers, theologians, and
statesmen have grappled with for millennia.”).
3. See Innocence: List of Those Freed from Death Row, DEATH PENALTY
INFO CTR., https://bit.ly/JksIrR [https://perma.cc/L45F-5ADX] (last visited Oct. 16,
2019) (listing those who have been freed from death row in the United States fol-
lowing acquittal, a decision by a prosecutor to drop charges, or an absolute pardon
from a governor based on evidence of innocence). But see Kent S. Scheidegger,
Fix System, but Keep Death Penalty, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (May 7, 2015), http://
bit.ly/2BzEtHn [https://perma.cc/V256-BV4D] (noting the former presence of
Timothy Hennis on the list and that DNA later linked Hennis to the murders he
was “exonerated” of committing). See Paul G. Cassell, Overstating America’s
Wrongful Conviction Rate? Reassessing the Conventional Wisdom About the Preva-
lence of Wrongful Convictions, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 815, 851 (2018) (estimating that
the wrongful conviction rate for violent crimes is somewhere between 0.016% and
0.062%).
4. See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Pun-
ishment: A New Consideration Transforms an Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
117 (2010) (arguing that, while previously ignored, the cost of imposing capital
punishment has become a powerful new consideration in the resurgence of legisla-
tive efforts to abolish capital punishment).
5. See ROBERT BLECKER, THE DEATH OF PUNISHMENT: SEARCHING FOR JUS-
TICE AMONG THE WORST OF THE WORST 237 (2013) (arguing that the inclusion of
robbery—an economic crime—as an aggravating circumstance in many jurisdic-
tions disproportionately affects African Americans). Compare Scott W. Howe,
The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the Eighth Amend-
ment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2083, 2086 (2004) (arguing that the death penalty is hopelessly
racially compromised), with Kent Scheidegger, Rebutting the Myths About Race
and the Death Penalty, 10 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 147, 163 (2012) (arguing that studies
that have surveyed the issue of racial disparity have been imprecise).
6. See, e.g., Thomas G. Saylor, Death Penalty Stewardship and the Current
State of Pennsylvania Capital Jurisprudence, 23 WIDENER L. J. 1, 22–32 (2013) (list-
ing flagrant examples of ineffective counsel in Pennsylvania capital cases).
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troversies surrounding lethal injection.7  Indeed, in the modern era
of capital punishment in the United States,8 five Supreme Court
justices have authored opinions either declaring or strongly intimat-
ing that capital punishment is per se unconstitutional.9
This Comment takes no position on capital punishment as a
policy matter but rests on four basic assumptions:  (1) “The Consti-
tution allows Capital Punishment;”10 (2) current Supreme Court ju-
risprudence forbids mandatory death sentences;11 (3) following the
Supreme Court’s capital punishment decisions issued on July 2,
1976,12 every jurisdiction in the United States that permits capital
punishment requires adjudication of guilt and penalty in separate
phases of the trial,13 where the sentencer decides the penalty based
on consideration of factors that weigh in favor of death (aggravat-
ing circumstances) and circumstances that weigh against death (mit-
igating circumstances);14 and (4) the Sixth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution15 requires juries to find every fact necessary to sen-
tence a defendant to death.16  It is currently unclear as to whether it
7. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO.
L. J. 1331, 1360 (2014) (describing difficulties in obtaining drugs for lethal injec-
tion); id. at 1357 (describing painful executions due to states’ using alternate
drugs).
8. The period following Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  Steiker &
Steiker, supra note 4, at 157.
9. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (BREYER, J. & GINS-
BURG, J., dissenting); Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Furman, 408 U.S. at 257–306 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 314–71 (Marshall, J., concurring).
10. Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1122 (2019) (citations omitted).
11. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 85 (1987) (invalidating statutes pro-
viding for mandatory death sentences for certain murders); Woodson v. North Car-
olina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (same).
12. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).  One commentator re-
ferred to these cases as the “July 2 Cases” based on the date that the Court de-
cided them. See James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court
and Capital Punishment, 1963–2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28 (2007).
13. See Lauren Morehouse, Note, Demanding the Last Word: Why Defend-
ants Deserve the Final Closing Argument During the Sentencing Phase of Capital
Cases, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 841, 841 (2018) (noting that every jurisdiction with
capital punishment requires a bifurcated trial).
14. The Supreme Court forbids limiting the presentation of relevant mitigat-
ing evidence. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part,
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial[ ] by an
impartial jury. . . .”
16. See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 621–22 (2016) (applying Ring v. Ari-
zona to Florida’s Statute); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (applying
Apprendi v. New Jersey to capital sentencing); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 490 (2000) (citations omitted) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires a
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is constitutional for a judge to make that ultimate sentencing deci-
sion based on a jury’s findings of fact or whether the Constitution
requires that the jury itself impose a capital sentence.17
Among the jurisdictions that permit capital punishment,18 the
sentencing schemes fall into three rough categories:  (1) jurisdic-
tions where the jury has the sole responsibility for sentencing a per-
son convicted of a capital crime to death;19 (2) jurisdictions where a
jury’s sentence of death, life imprisonment, or a term of imprison-
ment binds the judge, unless the jury is not unanimous;20 and (3)
jurisdictions where the jury is discharged after finding that an ag-
gravating circumstance exists and then a judge or panel of judges
weighs aggravation against mitigation to determine the offender’s
sentence.21  This Comment is concerned with the constitutionality
of the sentencing schemes of the five states that fall into the second
and third categories.
Part II of this Comment provides background as to the begin-
ning of capital punishment’s modern era in the United States.  Part
II also outlines the evolution of the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the jury requirement in capital sentencing.  Part III demonstrates
that, based on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the Sixth
Amendment does not require anything from a jury in capital cases
beyond finding an aggravating circumstance exists or convicting the
defendant of an underlying capital felony.  Part III also provides a
model for ensuring that capital sentencing is more uniform and less
like “being struck by lightning . . . .”22
jury to find every fact necessary to increase a criminal sentence beyond its statu-
tory maximum).
17. Compare Ring, 536 U.S. at 614 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment) (as-
serting that jury sentencing is constitutionally required), with id. at 612–13 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (disputing JUSTICE BREYER’s suggestion).
18. Twenty-nine states, the Federal Government, and the U.S. Military allow
capital punishment. See States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PEN-
ALTY INFO. CTR. (last visited Sept. 26, 2019), https://bit.ly/2pUfzfl [https://perma
.cc/6AK6-EZ7V].
19. See Life Verdict or Hung Jury? How States Treat Non-Unanimous Jury
Votes in Capital-Sentencing Proceedings, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (last up-
dated Jan. 17, 2018), https://bit.ly/2SaEDM9 [https://perma.cc/PE7N-39SA].
20. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(f) (2017); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(f) (2017);
MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2013).
21. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (2017) (providing for a sentencing
hearing conducted by “the court”); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2520–21 (Cum. Supp.
2018) (providing for a sentencing hearing conducted by three-judge panel).
22. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Supreme Court and the Jury Requirement: 1972–2002
1. Furman Giveth, Gregg Taketh Away
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Furman v. Georgia23 must in-
form any understanding of capital sentencing in the United States.
At the time the Court decided Furman, juries essentially had “un-
guided discretion” in capital sentencing.24  The Court’s one-para-
graph per curiam opinion in Furman provides little guidance as to
what is necessary for capital punishment to be constitutional.25
Each of the five justices in the Furman majority wrote separate con-
curring opinions expressing varying rationales for their decisions.26
Justice Douglas focused heavily on what he viewed to be the ra-
cially discriminatory aspect of the death penalty’s application in the
United States.27  Justice Stewart and Justice White each highlighted
the arbitrariness of the system at the time.28  Justice Brennan de-
clared that the death penalty was unconstitutional as a punishment
because it was “fatally offensive to human dignity.”29  Justice Mar-
shall similarly expressed his belief that capital punishment was cruel
and unusual, famously stating that, if “the average citizen” knew
more about capital punishment, he “would, in my opinion, find it
shocking to his conscience and sense of justice.”30
Following the Court’s decision in Furman—with the death pen-
alty’s future in doubt—states passed new statutes to remedy the de-
fects in the statutes that the Court invalidated.  Some statutes
provided a mandatory death penalty for certain crimes.31  In others,
23. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
24. Maria T. Kolar, “Finding” a Way to Complete the Ring of Capital Jury
Sentencing, 95 DENV. L. REV. 671, 677 (2018).
25. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40 (1972) (per curiam).  Following a brief recita-
tion of the identities of the petitioners, the majority stated:
The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty
in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  The judgment in each case is
therefore reversed insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death sentence im-
posed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings.
Id.
26. See id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring); id. at
314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
27. See id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
28. See id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J.,
concurring).
29. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 369 (Marshall, J., concurring)
31. E.g., Act of Apr. 8, 1974, ch. 1201, § 1, 1974 N.C. Sess. Laws 323, 323,
invalidated by Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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defendants became eligible for death when they were convicted of
an underlying capital felony during the guilt stage32 or when “aggra-
vating circumstances” were proven during a second phase of the
trial33—usually referred to as the “penalty phase.”34  In schemes
with a penalty phase, the trier considers aggravating circumstances
or underlying capital offenses against mitigating factors, and it
sentences the offender based on that consideration.35
On January 22, 1976, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
five cases challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty gen-
erally and the state statutes of Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Caro-
lina, and Louisiana specifically.36  On July 2, 1976, the Supreme
Court issued its decisions in each of the five cases.37  Bare majori-
ties struck down Louisiana’s and North Carolina’s mandatory death
penalty statutes,38 but in the other three cases the Court upheld
death penalty laws, including in Gregg, in which the judgment en-
ded a period of national uncertainty and affirmed the constitution-
ality of capital punishment as a general matter.39  The Gregg
plurality, consisting of Justice Stewart, Justice Powell, and Justice
Stevens, recognized that death penalty statutes must provide a lim-
iting function that takes into account both the terrible nature of the
crime and factors that call for mercy.40  The plurality also stated
32. See, e.g., Act of June 14, 1973, ch. 426 art. 1-3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1122,
1125 (current version at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071(2019)).
33. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 8, 1972, ch. 72-724, § 9, 1973 Fla. Laws 15, 20–22,
invalidated by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
34. Accord State v. Flowers, 266 So. 3d 772, 776 n.1 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017).
35. See, e.g., 42 PA. CON. STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (2018).
36. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 423 U.S. 1082–83 (1976) (Order Granting Peti-
tion for Certiorari); Gregg v. Georgia, 423 U.S. 1082 (1976) (Order Granting Peti-
tion for Certiorari); Jurek v. Texas, 423 U.S. 1082 (1976) (Order Granting Petition
for Certiorari); Woodson v. North Carolina, 423 U.S. 1082 (1976) (Order Granting
Petition for Certiorari); Proffitt v. Florida, 423 U.S. 1082 (1976) (Order Granting
Petition for Certiorari).
37. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
38. See Roberts, 428 U.S. at 338 (Opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ);
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 301 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.).
39. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) (“We
now consider specifically whether the sentence of death for the crime of murder is
a per se violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
We note first that history and precedent strongly support a negative answer to this
question.”). See also id. at 207 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (“The issue in this case is whether the death penalty imposed for mur-
der on petitioner Gregg under the new Georgia statutory scheme may constitu-
tionally be carried out.  I agree that it may.”).
40. See id. at 189 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.) (citations
omitted).
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that the Court “presumes the validity” of a procedure that a demo-
cratically elected legislature adopts.41  Relevant to this Comment,
the plurality identified one advantage inherent in a system such as
Georgia’s, in which the jury acts as sentencer—that it reflects the
community’s values.42  While Gregg is the canon case and the most
identified of the July 2 Cases,43 the Court’s judgment in Proffitt v.
Florida,44 which upheld the ability of judges to exercise sole sen-
tencing discretion, is the most relevant case for this Comment.
2. Proffitt Validates Judicial Sentencing in Death Penalty Cases
Florida’s post-Furman law reserved a role for juries in capital
sentencing.45  Unlike the Georgia statute, however, the jury’s ver-
dict was merely advisory, and the trial judge possessed discretion to
override it.46  Under the Florida statute, the trial court—in writ-
ing—made factual findings necessary to render a death sentence
and served as the sole sentencing authority.47
Having ruled in favor of the Georgia in Gregg, the Supreme
Court shifted its focus to Florida in Proffitt.  As in Gregg, there was
no majority opinion in Proffitt, and the same trio who had written
the plurality opinion and judgment of the Court in Gregg wrote a
joint opinion representing the judgment of the Court.48  While the
Florida law lacked Georgia’s statutory proportionality review re-
quirement, the plurality nonetheless found that, when conducting
appellate review, the Florida Supreme Court performed the same
limiting function as Georgia’s mandatory proportionality review.49
As to whether the judge can make the ultimate sentencing de-
termination instead of the jury, the Proffitt plurality rejected the
41. Id. at 175.
42. Id. at 190 (citations omitted).
43. See Liebman, supra note 12, at 28.
44. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
45. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (1973).  The Florida statute also did not require a
jury to make explicit findings as to the existence of an aggravating circumstance
necessary for the imposition of a death sentence, which the Court later determined
to be a fatal flaw to the constitutionality of an amended version of the law. See
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 622 (2016).
46. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 249 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.). Such
a phenomenon has been known as the “jury override.”  Scott E. Erlich, Comment,
The Jury Override: A Blend of Politics and Death, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1403, 1405
(1996).
47. FLA STAT. § 921.141(3)–(3)(a) (1973).
48. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 244 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.).
49. See id. at 258–59.  In short, proportionality review is a system where a
court “compare[s] the sentence in the case before it with the penalties imposed in
similar cases . . . .”  Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44 (1984).
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notion that the Constitution requires juries to serve as the sentenc-
ing authority, stating as follows:
This Court . . . has never suggested that jury sentencing is consti-
tutionally required.  And it would appear that judicial sentencing
should lead, if anything, to even greater consistency in the impo-
sition at the trial court level of capital punishment, since a trial
judge is more experienced in sentencing than a jury, and there-
fore is better able to impose sentences similar to those imposed
in analogous cases.50
Along with the plurality, four justices concluded that judicial sen-
tencing passed constitutional scrutiny,51 but this did not settle the
matter.  Over the next four decades, litigation ensued as to what
extent the Constitution permits trial courts to act as sentencing
authorities.
3. Stare Decisis as a Platitude: Post-Proffitt Developments
Regarding Judicial Sentencing in Capital Cases
a. Spaziano, Hildwin, and Walton: No Constitutional Right to
Jury Factfinding
Exactly eight years after its decision in Proffitt, the Court again
addressed the constitutionality of the Florida death penalty statute
in Spaziano v. Florida.52  After a jury convicted Joseph Robert
Spaziano of murder, a majority of the jury, in its advisory role
under the Florida statute, recommended a sentence of life in
prison.53  Despite that recommendation, the trial judge overrode
the jury’s advisory verdict and sentenced Spaziano to death.54  On
certiorari, Spaziano raised two sentencing-related claims.  Spazi-
ano’s first sentencing-related claim attacked the constitutionality of
allowing judges to sentence defendants to death when a jury recom-
mends life imprisonment, while the second challenged the Florida
Supreme Court’s standard for reviewing an override of the jury’s
sentencing recommendation.55
50. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252 (citations omitted).
51. See id. at 261 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 260–61 (White, J., joined
by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring).
52. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
53. Id. at 451.
54. Id. at 451–52.  The Florida Supreme Court overturned Spaziano’s initial
death sentence because the trial judge impermissibly looked at a confidential por-
tion of a presentencing report, which neither party was given a copy of. Id. at 452
(citing Spaziano v. State, 393 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1981)).  On remand, the trial court
again sentenced Spaziano to death. Id. at 453.
55. Id. at 449.
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Spaziano’s challenge to his death sentence had three parts.
First, Spaziano claimed that the rarity of judicial sentencing as com-
pared to jury sentencing violates the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.56  Next, he argued that, because a jury made a rec-
ommendation of life, the judge’s override of the decision exposed
him to double jeopardy, thus violating the Fifth Amendment.57  Fi-
nally, he argued that, based on the Court’s “recognition of the value
of the jury’s role, particularly in a capital proceeding, . . . the prac-
tice violates the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”58
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, concluded that
allowing a judge to override a jury’s recommendation of death is
constitutional.59  Addressing Spaziano’s lead argument—that most
states with capital punishment vested sentencing discretion with ju-
ries—the Court stated that “[t]he Eighth Amendment is not vio-
lated every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a
majority of its sisters over how best to administer its criminal
laws.”60  The Court then addressed Spaziano’s Sixth Amendment
argument and rejected it, holding that “neither the nature of, nor
the purpose behind, the death penalty requires jury sentencing
. . . .”61
What is most notable about Spaziano is Justice Stevens’s con-
curring and dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stevens con-
cluded—contrary to the Proffitt plurality he joined—that the
Constitution is only satisfied when “the decision to impose the
death penalty is made by a jury rather than by a single government
official.”62
In 1989, the Court again addressed the Florida death penalty
statute in Hildwin v. Florida.63  A judge sentenced Paul Hildwin to
death following a jury’s unanimous sentence recommendation.64
Unlike Spaziano, who waged his primary attack on his death sen-
tence using the Eighth Amendment,65 Hildwin argued that the
Florida statute violated the Sixth Amendment because it “per-
56. See id. at 461.
57. Id. at 457–58.
58. Id. at 458.
59. See id. at 465.
60. Id. at 464.
61. Id.
62. Compare Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 469 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), with Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.).
63. Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam).
64. Id. at 639.
65. See Spaziano, 447 U.S. at 457.
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mit[ted] the imposition of death without a specific finding by the
jury that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to qualify the
defendant for capital punishment.”66
In a brief per curiam opinion, the Court approvingly cited to
Spaziano and rejected Hildwin’s claim, stating,
If the Sixth Amendment permits a judge to impose a sentence of
death when the jury recommends life imprisonment . . . it follows
that it does not forbid the judge to make the written findings that
authorize imposition of a death sentence when the jury unani-
mously recommends a death sentence.67
In rejecting the argument that mandated a different result, the
Court reasoned that aggravating circumstances did not serve as ele-
ments of the crime but as “a sentencing factor that comes into play
only after the defendant has been found guilty.”68  Unlike in Spazi-
ano, there was no dissent beyond Justice Brennan’s and Justice
Marshall’s.69
In 1990, the Court decided Walton v. Arizona,70 which involved
a challenge to the Arizona death penalty statute then in effect.  In
Arizona, unlike in Florida, the jury did not have a role in sentenc-
ing once it decided guilt in a capital crime.71  The jury convicted
Walton of first-degree murder, and the trial judge conducted a sep-
arate sentencing hearing as Arizona law required.72  Finding two
aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances “suffi-
ciently substantial” for leniency, the trial court sentenced Walton to
death.73  The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Walton’s conviction
and death sentence.74  In 1988—the year prior to the Arizona Su-
preme Court’s decision in Walton’s direct appeal—the Ninth Cir-
66. Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 639.
67. Id. at 639–40 (citing Spaziano, 447 U.S. at 459).
68. Id. at 640 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McMillan v. Penn-
sylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986)).
69. See id. at 641 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Jus-
tice Brennan and Justice Marshall dissented from every post-Furman death pen-
alty case that ruled against the defendant—1,841 cases in total.  Matt Ford, How a
Victory for the Death Penalty May Hasten Its End, THE ATLANTIC (July 23, 2015),
https://bit.ly/2MQad0c [https://perma.cc/5VT2-Q9MJ].  For a more in-depth discus-
sion, see id.
70. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
71. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(b) (1989), invalidated by Ring v. Ari-
zona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
72. Walton, 497 U.S. at 645.
73. Id. (citations omitted).
74. Id. (citing State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017 (1989)).
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cuit ruled Arizona’s death penalty statute unconstitutional.75  The
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari “to resolve the conflict and
to settle issues that are of importance generally in the administra-
tion of the death penalty.”76
In his petition for certiorari, Walton presented three questions
for the Court’s review, one of which implicated the Sixth Amend-
ment right to jury sentencing.77  The basis for Walton’s Sixth
Amendment argument was that a jury, rather than a judge, must
find every fact necessary to sentence a defendant to death.78  In so
arguing, Walton attempted to distinguish between the Florida stat-
ute the Court had repeatedly upheld and the Arizona statute by
arguing that Florida involves the jury in capital sentencing, while
Arizona does not.79  Walton additionally argued that, “in Florida,
aggravating factors are only sentencing ‘considerations’ while in Ar-
izona they are ‘elements of the offense.’”80
Justice White’s opinion announcing the Court’s judgment re-
ceived majority support on only one issue81—Walton’s Sixth
Amendment claim.  In Part III of Justice White’s opinion, a major-
ity of the Court rejected Walton’s claim that the Arizona statute
violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.82  The Court re-
jected the distinction that Walton tried to draw between the Florida
and Arizona statutes by noting that, while a Florida jury did recom-
mend a sentence under that statute, it did not “make specific factual
findings with regard to the existence of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances and its recommendation is not binding . . . .”83  As to
Walton’s “sentencing ‘considerations’” argument, the Court noted
75. Id. at 647 (citing Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988) (en
banc)).
76. Id.
77. Brief for Petitioner at i, Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (No. 88-
7351).  Walton’s other issues challenged the mandatory nature of a death sentence
if he failed to prove the existence of a mitigating circumstance, placing the burden
on the defendant to prove mitigating circumstances, and whether one of the aggra-
vating circumstances proven against him was unconstitutional. See id. at 30, 39.
78. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 647.
79. See id. at 648
80. Id.
81. Justice Scalia concurred in full in Part III and concurred in the judgment,
reserving objections to the parts of the opinion that discussed the Eighth Amend-
ment and registering his objections to the Lockett line of cases, thus denying the
Court a majority. See id. at 656 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (opining that the Court’s cases since Furman were antithetical to the
underpinnings of Furman).  Thus, Justice White’s opinion only represents a plural-
ity of the Court insofar as it relates to the Eighth Amendment.
82. See id. at 649 (majority opinion).  The plurality also rejected Walton’s
Eighth Amendment claims. See id. at 655–56 (plurality opinion).
83. Id. at 648 (majority opinion).
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that, in a previous case, they had held that aggravating circum-
stances “are not separate penalties or offenses, but are ‘standards to
guide the making of [the] choice’ between the alternative verdicts
of death and life imprisonment.”84
Given later developments in Sixth Amendment capital juris-
prudence,85 Justice Stevens’s solitary dissent in Walton is notewor-
thy.86  Departing from the broad approach he espoused in
Spaziano,87 Justice Stevens focused instead on a narrower issue—
that, in his opinion, the aggravating circumstances the judge found
in Arizona’s statute were elements of a capital crime because, “in
their absence, that sentence is unavailable under §§ 13-1105 and 13-
703.”88  To support his argument, Justice Stevens asserted that the
original understanding of the Sixth Amendment required juries to
find the existence of an aggravating circumstance.89  Moreover, he
argued that, at the time the Court incorporated the Sixth Amend-
ment in Duncan v. Louisiana,90 Walton would have succeeded in
having his death sentence overturned.91  Justice Stevens further la-
mented “the gradual ‘increase and spread’” of the Court’s prece-
dents in favor of judges “to the utter disuse of juries in questions of
the most momentous concern.”92  Despite writing a solitary dissent-
ing opinion, Justice Stevens’s views on the jury’s role in both capital
and non-capital cases would be binding precedent only 12 years
later.93
84. Id. (quoting Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 156 (1986)).
85. See infra Parts II.A.3.c & II.B.
86. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 708 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Additionally, Justice
Brennan dissented, in an opinion joined by Justice Marshall, restating his belief
that capital punishment is per se unconstitutional. See id. at 674–75 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also Matt Ford, supra note 69.  Justice Blackmun also dissented,
joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens. Id. at 677 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
87. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 469 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
88. Walton, 497 U.S. at 709 n.1 (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,
88 (1986); and then citing Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385 (1986)).
89. See id. at 710–11 (quoting Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding and the Death
Penalty: The Scope of a Capital Defendant’s Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1989)).
90. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
91. Walton, 497 U.S. at 711 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 714 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343–44 (1769)).
93. See infra Part II.A.3.
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b. Jones and Apprendi Cast Doubt on Walton
Jones v. United States94 appeared on its face as a relatively ba-
nal case interpreting a federal carjacking statute95 rather than the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment as it relates to judges and juries.
The question presented to the Court was whether the federal
carjacking statute defined three different crimes that must be
presented in an indictment and proved to a jury or a single crime
with three different maximum penalties “exempt from the require-
ments of charge and jury verdict.”96  The petitioner, Nathaniel
Jones, was charged under a general indictment that did not require
the jury to prove the occurrence of bodily injury, a fact that, under
the statute, would have increased the maximum sentence from 15 to
25 years.97  Jones was informed at his arraignment that he faced a
maximum of 15 years in prison.98  At trial, the jury instructions did
not require the jury to find that serious bodily injury occurred, and
the jury convicted Jones.99  The court imposed a 25-year sentence
because it found by a preponderance of the evidence that the victim
suffered serious bodily injury.100  The Ninth Circuit affirmed Jones’s
sentence.101
In a five to four opinion authored by Justice Souter, the Court
analyzed the statute’s text and legislative history and concluded
that, under the fairest reading of the statute, bodily injury was an
element of the crime rather than a sentencing factor.102  While ac-
knowledging that there was merit to the sentencing factor argu-
ment, the majority refused to construe the law in such a way,
instead resolving the question under the principle of constitutional
avoidance, stating:  “where a statute is susceptible of two construc-
tions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions
arise and by the other . . . such questions are avoided, our duty is to
adopt the latter.”103
94. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1993).
96. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229.
97. See id. at 230.
98. Id. at 230–31.
99. Id. at 231.
100. Id.
101. Id. n.2 (citing United States v. Oliver, Nos. 96-10176, 96-10177, 96-1017,
116 F.3d 1487, 1997 WL 355922 (9th Cir. June 27, 1997) (unpublished table
opinion)).
102. See id. at 232–39.
103. Id. at 239 (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213
U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).  For more on constitutional avoidance, see Ashwander v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (listing
seven rules the Court uses to avoid constitutional questions).
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The dissent—authored by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and JUSTICE BREYER104—
chided the majority for its approach as a matter of statutory con-
struction and argued that the majority’s approach was an “attempt
to create instability[,]” which was “neither a proper use of the rule
of constitutional doubt nor a persuasive reading of our prece-
dents.”105  The dissent further argued that the majority provided lit-
tle guidance as to what constitutes an “element” of a crime.106  The
majority responded in dicta by proposing a constitutional test for
determining whether something is an “element.”  The majority’s
test was:
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any
fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum
penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted
to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.107
The majority conceded that the interpretation was “suggest[ed]
rather than establish[ed]” by the Court’s precedents.108  The dis-
senters predicted the Court’s new test would disturb the Court’s
precedent regarding the right to a jury trial in a capital case.109  The
dissent further argued that “Walton would appear to have been a
better candidate for the Court’s new approach than is the instant
case.”110  The majority disputed the assertion that Jones vitiated the
Court’s recent Sixth Amendment capital jurisprudence.111  Only
one year later, however, the constitutional doubt the Court alluded
to in Jones would become constitutional certainty.
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,112 the Court considered whether
“the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maxi-
mum prison sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by
104. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 254 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 264.
106. Id. at 269
107. Id. at 243 n.6 (majority opinion).
108. Id.
109. See id. at 272 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“If it is constitutionally imper-
missible to allow a judge’s finding to increase the maximum punishment for
carjacking by 10 years, it is not clear why a judge’s finding may increase the maxi-
mum punishment for murder from imprisonment to death.”).
110. Id.
111. See id. at 251 (majority opinion) (“[In Walton], the Court described . . .
aggravating circumstances . . . as ‘standards to guide the . . . choice between the
alternative verdicts of death and life imprisonment.’” (quoting Walton v. Arizona,
497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990))).
112. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”113  The
statute at issue in Apprendi was a New Jersey “hate crime” law that
included enhanced penalties “if the trial judge f[ound], by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that ‘the defendant in committing the
crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group . . .
because of race . . . .”114  After Charles Apprendi pleaded guilty to
charges that carried a sentencing range of five to ten years, the
prosecution requested that the hate crime statute apply because the
offense was motivated by racial animus, and the judge agreed,
thereby doubling the minimum and maximum sentences.115  The
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed.116
The majority opinion in Apprendi, written by Justice Stevens
and joined by the four other justices from the Jones majority, invali-
dated Apprendi’s sentence.117  The rule the majority applied to de-
cide Apprendi was similar to the rule suggested in dicta in Jones,
“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.”118  According to the majority, that a part of a statute is la-
beled an element was irrelevant.119  Instead, “the relevant inquiry is
one not of form, but of effect—does the required finding expose the
defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the
jury’s guilty verdict?”120  The majority further claimed that their de-
cision had no impact on the Court’s previous decision in Walton; a
first degree murder conviction exposed a defendant to a death sen-
tence.121  Therefore, the judge could not increase the maximum
penalty in the sentencing hearing.122
Justice O’Connor’s dissent123—joined by the other Jones dis-
senters—mainly concerned itself with the Court’s creation of a new
bright-line rule and departure from its previous deference to legis-
113. Id. at 469.
114. Id. at 468–69 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000)).
115. See id. at 470–71.
116. Id. at 472 (citing State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485 (N.J. 1999)).
117. See id. at 497.
118. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
119. See id. at 494
120. Id.
121. Id. at 496–97.
122. Id. at 497 (citation omitted).
123. See id. at 523 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). JUSTICE BREYER also authored
a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, where he argued—in typically Breyer-
ian fashion—that the new rule, while laudable in theory, was unworkable in prac-
tice. See id. at 555 (BREYER, J., dissenting).
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latures.124  Furthermore, Justice O’Connor lamented that the ma-
jority “marshalls virtually no authority to support its extraordinary
rule.”125  Justice O’Connor additionally focused on the practical ef-
fects of the new rule, arguing that it could lead to the invalidation of
the “[Federal] Sentencing Guidelines.”126  Justice O’Connor re-
sponded to the majority’s attempt to distinguish Walton from Ap-
prendi by noting that, without a judge’s finding an aggravating
circumstance, a defendant cannot receive a death sentence and,
therefore, the maximum sentence a person could receive without a
finding of an aggravating circumstance was life imprisonment.127
Nearly two years later, the Jones-Apprendi dissenters would receive
their answer as to the applicability of the new rule to capital
sentencing.
c. The Supreme Court Puts a Ring on It
Barely 12 years after it decided Walton and apparently settled
the issue, the Court heard Ring v. Arizona.128 Ring concerned
Timothy Ring, who was sentenced to death pursuant to a procedure
substantially identical to the one that saw Jeffrey Walton sentenced
to death.129  Despite reservations as to the statute’s continued appli-
cability in light of Apprendi, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld
Ring’s conviction and death sentence because it was bound under
the Supremacy Clause to apply Walton.130  At the U.S. Supreme
Court, Ring challenged the procedure under which he was sen-
tenced, but he did so in a “tightly delineated” fashion.131  Instead of
launching a facial attack on judicial sentencing, like the petitioners
in the prior cases, Ring’s claim was limited to arguing “that the
124. See id. at 524–25 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 525.
126. Id. at 550. JUSTICE BREYER, who joined Justice O’Connor’s opinion, was
a Commissioner of the United States Sentencing Commission at the time it
adopted the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and he has written extensively on the
topic. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises on Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988).
127. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 540–41 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). JUSTICE
THOMAS acknowledged Justice O’Connor was correct. Id. at 522 (THOMAS, J.,
concurring).  But whether to overturn Walton was “a question for another day.”
Id. at 523.
128. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
129. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (2001), with ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (1989).
130. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 596 (citing State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1151 (Ariz.
2001)).
131. Id. at 597 n.4.  The Court also restated the conclusion from Proffitt that
“[i]t has never been suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required.”
Id. at 597–98 n.4. (brackets omitted) (quoting Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)).
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Sixth Amendment required jury findings on the aggravating circum-
stances asserted against him.”132  Arizona’s principal argument was
that under the Arizona statute, a jury conviction for first-degree
murder exposed the defendant to life in prison or death,133 and,
therefore, Ring was sentenced “within the range of punishment au-
thorized by the jury verdict.”134
Predictably, the Court135 held that “Walton and Apprendi are
irreconcilable; our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence cannot be
home to both.”136  The majority justified its deviation from the dicta
in its prior cases,137 which disputed that the rules announced in
those cases rendered Walton obsolete by noting that the Arizona
Supreme Court found that the Apprendi majority interpreted Ari-
zona state law incorrectly.138  Responding to Arizona’s argument
about the jury’s verdict authorizing the sentence of death, the ma-
jority restated that “the relevant inquiry” under Apprendi is one of
effect rather than form and that a judge’s finding of an aggravating
circumstance under the Arizona statute increased the maximum
sentence for first-degree murder.139  Addressing Arizona’s secon-
dary argument—based on Walton—that aggravating circumstances
were sentencing factors rather than elements of the offense, the ma-
jority noted that “Apprendi renders the argument untenable; Ap-
prendi repeatedly instructs . . . that the characterization of a fact or
circumstance as an ‘element’ or a ‘sentencing factor’ is not determi-
native of the question ‘who decides,’ judge or jury.”140
The true intrigue in Ring as to the breadth of its holding rests
in the dueling concurrences by Justice Scalia141 (joined by JUSTICE
132. Id. at 597 n.4.
133. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  § 13-1105(c) (2001).
134. Ring, 536 U.S. at 604.  Arizona made a secondary argument—based on
the Court’s distinction in Walton—that the aggravating circumstances in the Ari-
zona statute were sentencing factors rather than elements of the offense. Id. at
604–05.
135. Justice Kennedy, who voted in the minority in Apprendi and wrote the
principal dissent in Jones, joined the majority opinion in full while expressing his
belief that Apprendi “was wrongly decided . . . .” Id. at 613 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
136. Id. at 609.
137. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 251 (1999).
138. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 603 (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691
(1975)).
139. Id. at 603–04 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494).
140. Id. at 605–06 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492).
141. See id. at 610–13 (Scalia, J., concurring).  In this opinion, Justice Scalia
acknowledged that joining the majority opinion was “difficult” because Arizona’s
statute was created in response to a “line of decisions[, starting with Furman, that]
had no proper foundation in the Constitution.” Id. at 610 (citing Walton v. Ari-
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THOMAS) and JUSTICE BREYER’s (concurring alone and only in the
judgment).142  In his opinion, JUSTICE BREYER stated both his con-
tinued disapproval of Apprendi and, for the first time, his belief
“that jury sentencing in capital cases is mandated by the Eighth
Amendment.”143  In supporting his conclusion, he cited Justice Ste-
vens’s opinion in Spaziano, which noted that juries are “more at-
tuned to the community’s moral sensibility” because they “reflect
more accurately the composition and experiences of the community
as a whole . . . .”144  Justice Scalia responded to JUSTICE BREYER’s
assertion that the Eighth Amendment requires jury sentencing in
death penalty cases by stating:
[T]oday’s judgment has nothing to do with jury sentencing.  What
today’s decision says is that the jury must find the existence of
the fact that an aggravating factor existed.  Those States that
leave the ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge may con-
tinue to do so—by requiring a prior jury finding of aggravating
factor in the sentencing phase or, more simply, by placing the
aggravating-factor determination (where it logically belongs any-
way) in the guilt phase.145
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, while continuing to register ob-
jections to Apprendi, accepted the reality that “no principled read-
ing of Apprendi would allow Walton . . . to stand.”146  In a brief
dissent, Justice O’Connor lamented that “[b]y expanding on Ap-
prendi, the Court today exacerbates the harm done in that case. . . .
I would overrule Apprendi rather than Walton.”147
zona, 497 U.S. 639, 659–60 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)).
142. See id. at 613–19 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment).
143. Id. at 614.
144. Id. at 615 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Spaziano v. Flor-
ida, 468 U.S. 447, 481, 486 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
145. Id. at 612–13 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia’s response to JUSTICE
BREYER’s willingness to join a result dependent on Apprendi while reserving ob-
jections to the result of the opinion was vintage Scalia. See id. at 313 (“There is
really no way in which JUSTICE BREYER can travel with the happy band that
reaches today’s result unless he says yes to Apprendi.  Concisely put, JUSTICE
BREYER is on the wrong flight; he should either get off before the doors close, or
buy a ticket to Apprendi-land.”).
146. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy further cautioned the
court against “extend[ing]” Apprendi “without caution, for the States’ settled ex-
pectations deserve our respect.” Id.
147. Ring, 536 U.S. at 621 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
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B. Ring’s Aftermath
1. Legislative Change Following Ring
At the time the Court decided Ring, five states reserved capital
sentencing to judges alone.148  Four others had “hybrid” systems,
which reserved a role for the jury but allowed the judge to make the
ultimate sentencing determination.149  In response to Ring, each
state with judge-only sentencing amended its statute, with three
states opting in favor of jury sentencing150 and Nebraska requiring
that the jury find aggravating circumstances but then allowing a
judge or panel of three judges to sentence the defendant.151  Of the
hybrid states, two altered their schemes post-Ring, with Indiana re-
quiring a unanimous finding of aggravating circumstances by a jury
to sentence a defendant to death152 and Delaware retaining the ad-
visory jury but requiring said jury to find at least one aggravating
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt before a judge could sen-
tence the defendant.153  Three states, Alabama, Florida, and Mon-
tana opted against changing their statutes, despite Justice
O’Connor’s identifying them as vulnerable in her Ring dissent.154
2. Court Decisions Following Ring
Following Ring, one major question relevant to this Com-
ment155 remained regarding the scope of the Court’s decision:  did
Ring create a constitutional right to jury sentencing in death penalty
cases?156  The Supreme Court left this issue mostly to state courts.
148. Id. at 608 n.6. (majority opinion) (acknowledging the Arizona statute
and citing statutes from Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska).
149. Id. (citing statutes from Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana).
150. See Act of Aug. 1, 2002, ch. 1, §§ 1–3, 2002 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2155,
2155–60 (codified as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752); Act of July 12,
2002, ch. 1, § 1, 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 1 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-1.3-1201 (2018)); Act of Feb. 13, 2003, ch. 19, § 1, 2003 Idaho Sess. Laws 71, 71
(codified as amended at IDAHO CODE 19-2515 (2018)).
151. See Act of Nov. 22, 2002, No. 1, §§ 11–14, 2002 Neb. Laws 1, 6–9 (codi-
fied as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 to -2522 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
152. See Act of May 5, 2003, No. 147, § 1, 2003 Ind. Acts 1115, 1120 (codified
as amended at IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(l) (2019).
153. See Act of July 22, 2002, §§ 1–5, 73 Del. Laws ch. 423 (2002), invalidated
by Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016).
154. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 621 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
155. The other major question was whether Ring applied retroactively to
cases in which convictions were final.  A conviction is final when it has been af-
firmed on direct review and certiorari is denied or the time for seeking certiorari
has lapsed.  Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n.5 (1965).  As to whether Ring
was retroactively applicable, the Court answered in the negative. See Schriro v.
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004).
156. Cf. Ring, 536 U.S. at 613 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the possibility of
confusion as a result of JUSTICE BREYER’s opinion).
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Among the states that retained judicial sentencing, the first to
address Ring’s scope was Florida in Bottoson v. Moore.157  In Bot-
toson, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that Ring did not dis-
turb the Court’s prior judgments in Proffitt, Spaziano, and Hildwin,
each of which upheld the Florida statute.158  Because the Supreme
Court did not instruct the Florida Supreme Court to reconsider the
law in light of Ring, the court determined that the previous deci-
sions were controlling.159  The Alabama,160 Delaware,161 and Ne-
braska162 Supreme Courts followed suit.  Uniquely among Ring-
affected states, the Supreme Court of Montana has never addressed
the issue of whether jury sentencing is required.163  Unsettled ques-
tions remained, such as the status of the Florida statute, which did
not require the jury to explicitly find aggravating circumstances,164
and it took more than 13 years of litigation for the U.S. Supreme
Court to address the statute.
3. Hurst Resolves Questions and Creates More
a. A Broad Question and a Narrow Holding
In October 2015, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Hurst
v. Florida.165  A jury convicted Timothy Hurst of murder, and a
judge sentenced him to death following a trial in which the jury
recommended death by a bare majority.166  However, the jury
“d[id] not make specific factual findings” regarding “the existence
of . . . aggravating circumstances . . . .”167  Over dissent, the Florida
157. Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
158. Id. at 695 n.4 (citing Supreme Court cases upholding the Florida capital
sentencing statute).
159. Id. at 695 (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case,
yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [other
courts] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1984))).
160. See Ex parte Waldrop, 859 So. 2d 1181 (Ala. 2002).
161. See Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 314 (Del. 2003).
162. See State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2003).
163. It has, however, ruled that Ring is not retroactive.  Gratzer v. Mahoney,
150 P.3d 343, 348 (Mont. 2006).  Further, no inmate has been sentenced to death in
Montana since 1996. See Montana Prosecutors Drop Death Penalty Against Men-
tally Ill Defendant, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (July 26, 2018), https://bit.ly/
2GA6yUK [https://perma.cc/64W4-TR9Q].  Thus, a challenge to judicial sentenc-
ing based on Ring has not been necessary.
164. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (2001).
165. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
166. See id. at 620.
167. Id. at 622 (citation omitted) (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
648 (1990)).
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Supreme Court upheld Hurst’s death sentence.168  Unlike Ring, in
which the Court addressed a “tightly delineated” Sixth Amendment
claim,169 Hurst involved a direct challenge to the constitutionality of
capital sentencing by judges on Eighth Amendment grounds in ad-
dition to bringing a challenge under the Sixth Amendment and
Ring.170  Florida, for its part, argued that the statute complied with
Ring and, even if it did not, stare decisis should control based on
the Court’s earlier decisions in Hildwin and Spaziano.171
The Court held that, “[i]n light of Ring,” Hurst’s sentence vio-
lated the Sixth Amendment.172  Because the Florida Supreme
Court had relied on the fact that the Court did not overrule its prior
decisions upholding the death penalty,173 the Court “expressly
overrule[d] Spaziano and Hildwin in relevant part.”174  The Court
then noted that Walton was a “mere application” of Hildwin to Ari-
zona’s capital sentencing law.175  The Court did not address Hurst’s
Eighth Amendment claims.176
b. Disagreement Post-Hurst
In Hurst’s immediate aftermath, Florida amended its capital
sentencing statute to require juries to unanimously find aggravating
168. See id. at 620–21 (citing Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435, 450 (Fla. 2014)
(Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
169. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 594 n.4. (2002).
170. Brief for Petitioner at 26–31, Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) (No.
14-7505).
171. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 622–23 (citing Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989)
(per curiam); and then citing Spaziano v. Florida, 486 U.S. 447 (1984)).
172. Id. at 622.
173. See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
174. Hurst, 136 S.Ct. at 623 (emphasis added).  The Court further stated that
Spaziano and Hildwin were only “overruled to the extent they allow a sentencing
judge to find an aggravating circumstance, independent of a jury’s factfinding, that
is necessary for imposition of the death penalty.” Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
This Comment submits that the “relevant part” and “to the extent” language
placed a limit on the breadth of Hurst’s holding. See State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d
566, 584 (Mo. 2019); infra Parts III.A.1 & III.A.2.
175. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 623 (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648
(1990)).
176. JUSTICE BREYER concurred in the judgment, restating his “view that ‘the
Eighth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, make the decision to sentence a
defendant to death.’” Id. at 624 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment)).
JUSTICE ALITO authored a lone dissent. See id. at 624–27 (ALITO, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Florida statute complied with Ring and that the Court erred in
overruling prior precedents).
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circumstances.177  Under the amended statute, following a jury’s
unanimous determination of aggravating circumstances, the trial
court could sentence the defendant to death based on the recom-
mendation of ten jurors.178  However, on remand, a divided Florida
Supreme Court interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst
along with the Eighth Amendment and the Florida Constitution to
require a unanimous jury verdict as to the weighing requirement
and the existence of sufficient aggravating circumstances.179  In
2017, Florida amended its statute to comply with Hurst II’s
mandate.180
In the period between the passage of the new Florida statute
and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst II—in the back-
drop of a narrow failure to abolish the death penalty in Dela-
ware181—the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the implications
of Hurst as to its own sentencing scheme.  In Rauf v. State,182 the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires
a jury alone to find that aggravating circumstances exist and that
they outweigh mitigating circumstances.183  The court’s per curiam
opinion spans less than three pages and provides scant reasoning
for its decision.184  Although Rauf was a better vehicle for certiorari
177. See Act of Mar. 7, 2016, ch. 2016-13, § 3, 2016 Fla. Laws 1, 4, invalidated
by Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (Hurst II) cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161,
2161 (2017).
178. Act of Mar. 7, 2016, ch. 2016-13, § 3, 2016 Fla. Laws 1, 4.
179. See Hurst II, 202 So. 3d at 44.
180. See Act of Mar. 13, 2017, ch. 2017-1, § 1, 2017 Fla. Laws 1, 1 (Codified at
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(c) (2019)).  Later, the Florida Supreme Court held that
unanimous jury recommendations of death under the scheme ruled unconstitu-
tional in Hurst constituted harmless error and that Hurst was not retroactive.  Asay
v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 11–12 (Fla. 2016) (addressing retroactivity); Davis v. State,
207 So. 3d 142, 174–75 (Fla. 2016) (addressing harmless error).
181. See Jessica Masulli Reyes, Bill to Abolish Delaware Death Penalty Fails
in House, NEWS J. (Jan. 29, 2016, 12:46 AM), https://bit.ly/2TqL4LW [https://perma
.cc/B4UC-CEKE].
182. Rauf v. State 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) (per curiam).
183. Id. at 434.
184. There are, however two concurring opinions that received the support of
majority of the court. See id. at 434–82 (Strine, C.J., concurring); id. at 482–87
(Holland, J., concurring).
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than Hurst II,185 the Delaware Attorney General did not appeal the
ruling.186
In Ex parte Bohannon187 the Alabama Supreme Court reached
the opposite conclusion from the Delaware and Florida courts in its
application of Hurst.  It held that, “because in Alabama a jury, not
the judge, determines by a unanimous verdict the critical finding
that an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt
to make a defendant death-eligible, Alabama’s capital-sentencing
scheme does not violate the Sixth Amendment.”188  Despite the rul-
ing in Bohannon, Alabama no longer allows a judge to override a
jury’s recommendation.189
In State v. Jenkins,190 the Nebraska Supreme Court applied
Hurst for the first time on the merits.  The court expressed doubts
as to whether Jenkins had standing to challenge Nebraska’s statutes
because he had “waived a jury and expressly stated he would
‘rather have the judges’ for sentencing . . . .”191  The court nonethe-
less rejected Jenkins’s claim and reaffirmed its previous decisions
holding that the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury to make
the weighing decision in capital cases or issue the ultimate
sentence.192
185. The Delaware Supreme Court decided Rauf solely on Sixth Amendment
grounds. See id. at 434.  By contrast, the Florida Supreme Court decided Hurst II
on partly independent state grounds. See Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 44 (Fla.
2016).  The Supreme Court usually goes to great lengths to avoid cases decided on
independent state grounds, which Justice Scalia has referred to as “none of [the
Court’s] business . . . .”  Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 184 (2006) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
186. See Jessica Masulli Reyes & Matthew Albright, AG Won’t Appeal Dela-
ware Death Penalty Ruling, NEWS J. (Aug. 16, 2016, 1:15 PM), https://bit.ly/2D1qbjs
[https://perma.cc/2LBD-2NW5].  The Delaware Supreme Court later held that
Hurst applied retroactively. See Powell v. Delaware, 153 A.3d 69, 76 (Del. 2016).
187. Ex parte Bohannon, 222 So. 3d 525 (Ala. 2016).
188. Id. at 532.
189. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(f) (2017) (requiring ten jurors to recommend
death in order to impose a death sentence).
190. State v. Jenkins, 931 N.W.2d 851 (Neb. 2019).
191. It is worth noting that three capital defendants in Nebraska post-Hurst
have waived their right to a jury determination of aggravating circumstances. See
id. at 880; Brief for Appellant at 4, State v. Schroeder, No. 18-582, (Neb. May 17,
2019), 2019 WL 2165872; Martha Stoddard, It’s Now up to a Three-Judge Panel to
Decide Whether Aubrey Trail Gets the Death Penalty, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD
(July 11, 2019), https://bit.ly/2m7iZgG [https://perma.cc/977M-2H6T].
192. Jenkins, 931 N.W.2d at 880 (citing State v. Lotter, 917 N.W.2d 850 (Neb.
2018), cert denied, 139 S. Ct. 2716 (2019); and then citing State v. Gales, 658
N.W.2d 604 (2003)).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Sixth Amendment Does Not Require a Jury to Sentence a
Capital Defendant to Death
1. Hurst Did Not Completely Overturn Spaziano and Failed to
Address Proffitt
The Delaware Supreme Court engaged in a strained reading of
Hurst in holding that the Court’s decision requires jury sentenc-
ing.193 To accept the Delaware Supreme Court’s result in light of
that court’s prior precedent194 requires a conclusion that Hurst
went further than simply applying the Court’s decision in Ring to
the Florida death penalty statute.  The Hurst Court never repre-
sented its opinion as anything other than an application of Ring to
Florida’s capital sentencing statute.195  Indeed, unlike Timothy
Ring, who framed his argument to the Court to avoid the constitu-
tional question of jury sentencing,196 the petitioner in Hurst explic-
itly asked the Court to consider the constitutionality of jury
sentencing in the context of the Eighth Amendment,197 but the
Court refused.  Further, the jury sentencing question that the peti-
tioner presented to the Court was premised on Eighth Amendment
grounds,198 but the Delaware Supreme Court decided Rauf purely
on the Sixth Amendment.199  Most state200 and federal201 courts
that have considered the issue have disagreed with the Delaware
193. Cf. Stephanos Bibas, Apprendi in the States: The Virtues of Federalism as
a Structural Limit on Errors, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 7 n.37.  Then-
Professor (now-Third Circuit Judge) Bibas suggested that states that interpreted
Ring to require a jury to weigh life or death “have overread Ring as reserving for
juries the finding and weighing of mitigators, even though Ring’s rationale is lim-
ited to the initial aggravator that raises the maximum to death.” Id.  The same
reasoning holds true post-Hurst.  Additionally, to avoid going down the rabbit hole
of Florida Constitutional Law, this Comment treats the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision in Hurst II differently than it treats the Delaware Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Rauf because Rauf was decided on purely federal constitutional grounds.
As such, the soundness—or lack thereof—of Hurst II is immaterial to this
Comment.
194. See State v. Brice, 815 A.2d 314, 322 (Del. 2003) (finding that Ring did
not require jury sentencing).
195. See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 622 (2016).
196. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 594 n.4. (2002) (referring to Ring’s
claim as “tightly delineated”).
197. See Brief for Petitioner, Hurst v. Florida, supra note 170, at 26–31.
198. See id.
199. See Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 434 (Del. 2016).
200. State v. Lotter, 917 N.W.2d 850, 863 & n.60 (Neb. 2018) (citing cases
from Alabama, Indiana, Mississippi, Nevada, and Ohio), cert denied, 139 S. Ct.
2716 (2019).
201. Id. at 863 & n.59 (citing federal cases).
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Supreme Court, concluding instead that Hurst does not require a
jury to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors.
At best, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst is ambiguous.
One of the dissenters in Rauf—who would have held that Hurst did
not require jury sentencing—noted the Hurst Court’s vague lan-
guage as to the facts a jury must find and suggested that said vague-
ness may have been intentional.202  The other dissenting opinion in
Rauf noted that Hurst did not expressly overrule Spaziano in its
entirety and did not even address Proffitt.203  If the majority opin-
ion in Hurst requires jury sentencing, it is curious that JUSTICE
BREYER concurred only in the judgment and found it necessary to
write an opinion expressing his belief that the Constitution requires
jury sentencing.204  Both dissents in Rauf took note of the existence
of JUSTICE BREYER’s opinion,205 and one suggested that, if the ma-
jority’s intention was to create a right to jury sentencing, Justice
Scalia would not have joined the opinion.206  The combination of
JUSTICE BREYER’s opinion and the fact that Proffitt is not cited a
single time in Hurst—let alone overruled—is fatal to the suggestion
that a jury must serve as sentencer in capital trials.
2. Hurst Addressed Death Eligibility Rather than Death Selection
In Tuilaepa v. California,207 the Supreme Court identified two
separate aspects of capital sentencing, “the eligibility decision and
the selection decision.”208  “To render a defendant eligible for the
death penalty” for murder, “the trier . . . must convict the defendant
of murder and find one ‘aggravating circumstance’ (or its
equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase.”209  The death se-
202. See State v. Rauf, 145 A.3d 430, 507 (Del. 2016) (Vaughn, J., dissenting)
(citing Ex parte State, 223 So. 3d 954, 973 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016) (Joiner, J., con-
curring)).  Justice Vaughn reasoned that an earlier dissent from denial of certiorari
by JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, where she suggested that a jury must find that aggravat-
ing circumstances outweigh mitigating factors, supported this conclusion. See id.
(citing Woodward v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 1045, 1052–54 (SOTOMAYOR, J.,
dissenting)).
203. See id. at 497–98 (Valihura, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 623–24) (noting that the Supreme Court only over-
turned Spaziano in “relevant part”).
204. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 624 (2016) (BREYER, J., concurring in
judgment).
205. See Rauf, 145 A.3d at 498 (Valihura, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); id. at 503 (Vaughn, J., dissenting).
206. See id. at 503 (Vaughn, J., dissenting).
207. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994).
208. Id. at 971.
209. Id. at 971–72 (citing Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244–46 (1988);
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983)).
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lection decision—the ultimate sentencing decision—allows the
“sentencer” to make an “individualized determination on the basis
of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the
crime.”210  The Fourth Circuit has stated that the selection decision
is “not a factual determination, but a complex moral judgment.”211
The Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the presentation and
weight of mitigating evidence underscore how the selection decision
is different from the eligibility decision. Lockett v. Ohio212 and
Walton v. Arizona are two prime examples of this difference.  In
Lockett, the Court held that Ohio’s post-Furman death penalty stat-
ute213 unconstitutionally limited the presentation of relevant miti-
gating evidence.214  The statute in question provided three grounds
for mitigating a death sentence.215  The Supreme Court invalidated
the statute, holding that the Eighth Amendment requires that the
sentencer consider “as a mitigating factor[ ] any aspect of a defen-
dant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the of-
fense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death.”216  In Walton, the Court upheld an Arizona law that re-
quired defendants to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
mitigating circumstances existed.217  If the existence of a mitigating
factor were the type of factual determination that Ring and Hurst
addressed, it would face serious constitutional questions as a pre-
sumption against the defendant.218  The Walton Court rejected that
the existence of mitigating circumstances was this type of factual
determination.219
210. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972 (quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 479).
211. United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 516 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing United
States v. Fields, 516 F.3d 923, 950 (10th Cir. 2008); then citing United States v.
Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 993–94 (9th Cir. 2007); then citing United States v. Samp-
son, 486 F.3d 13, 31–32 (1st Cir. 2007); and then citing United States v. Fields, 483
F.3d 313, 345–46 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511,
533 (6th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
212. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
213. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2929.04(B) (1975).
214. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608.
215. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(1)–(3) (1975).
216. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.  The Court suggested that there may be cases in
which consideration of mitigation is not required, such as a murder committed by a
person serving life in prison. See id. n.11.  However, in a later case, the Court
foreclosed that possibility. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 85 (1987).
217. See Walton v. Arizona 497 U.S. 639, 649 (plurality).  In Kansas v. Marsh,
548 U.S. 163 (2006), the Court ruled that the case was controlled by the plurality in
Walton. Marsh, 548 U.S. at 169.
218. See generally Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (striking down a
state statute that required the defendant to prove a negated element defense for
murder by a preponderance of the evidence).
219. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 650.
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The Court’s decisions in Hurst and Ring concern proving ag-
gravating facts to a jury to make a defendant eligible for the death
penalty, but they make scant mention of selection.  A finding that
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances is
neither constitutionally required,220 nor is it a factual determina-
tion.221  The concession of Hurst’s counsel at oral argument that the
case primarily involved death selection222 only bolsters the argu-
ment that statutes providing for a judge (or panel of judges) to
make the selection rather than eligibility decision complies with the
Constitution.
B. Not Only Is Judicial Sentencing Constitutional, It Is
Preferable to Jury Sentencing
1. A Survey of the Issues with Jury Sentencing
a. The “Stealth Juror” and the “Single-Juror Veto”
A series of high-profile death penalty trials in recent years en-
ded with a single juror sparing the life of the killer, bringing the
power of a single juror in capital cases to the public conscious-
ness.223  In 20 states and under federal law, a single juror has the
power to sentence a capital defendant to life imprisonment without
the opportunity for the state to seek a new penalty phase.224
In his opinion in Ring, JUSTICE BREYER advanced the argu-
ment that, because retribution is the main justification for capital
punishment, a jury is best equipped to handle that role because they
are members of the community where the crime took place.225  The
Gregg triumvirate recognized that the death penalty exists because
of a “community’s belief that certain crimes are themselves so
grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response
220. See Marsh, 548 U.S. at 165–66 (holding that it is constitutionally permis-
sible for a capital sentencing statute to mandate death when aggravating and miti-
gating evidence are in equipoise).
221. See, e.g., United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 516 (4th Cir. 2013).
222. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616
(2016) (No. 14-7505).
223. See Associated Press, Juror: Panel Split 11–1 Favoring Execution in
Guard’s Murder, READING EAGLE, (July 11, 2017), https://bit.ly/2GydyRZ [https://
perma.cc/MAY6-UM32]; Peter Holley, A Lone Holdout Was Likely All That Stood
Between Theater Shooter and Death Sentence, Juror Says, WASH. POST (Aug. 8,
2015), https://wapo.st/2WZrubM [https://perma.cc/8VQR-MDEL].
224. See Life Verdict or Hung Jury? How States Treat Non-Unanimous Jury
Votes in Capital-Sentencing Proceedings, supra note 19 (noting that, in most states
with capital punishment, a single holdout juror in favor of life results in a life
sentence).
225. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614–616 (2002) (BREYER, J., concur-
ring in judgment).
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may be the penalty of death.”226  By the very nature of democratic
governance, such a community response need not be unanimous.  A
single juror holding power to impose a lesser sentence without con-
sidering death for a crime that the community deems worthy of
death serves as a direct refutation of the community.227
b. Jurors Do Not Understand Jury Instructions, but Jury
Instructions Are Vital in Capital Cases
The presumption that jurors understand and follow jury in-
structions is “[a] crucial assumption underlying [the criminal justice]
system . . . .”228  Recently, however, social science has come to light
suggesting that this presumption is wishful thinking.229  While it is
important for the criminal justice system that jurors understand in-
structions, it is even more important in the capital sentencing con-
text because the result of the jury’s decision is literally life or
death.230  Unsurprisingly, given the stakes, the Supreme Court fre-
quently hears cases challenging capital jury instructions.231
The Supreme Court does not require jurisdictions to adopt
standards for jury instructions.232  The lack of such a requirement
may seem puzzling; but, if a standard jury instruction is later found
to be constitutionally flawed, the consequences can be drastic.233
226. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Pow-
ell, & Stevens, JJ.).
227. Of course, implicit in the suggestion that some crimes deserve death is
that some crimes do not deserve death. See BLECKER, supra note 5, at 32–33 (sug-
gesting that some murderers do not deserve to die based on their lack of moral
culpability).  Thus, it is also a refutation of the community if a jury refuses to con-
sider life. Cf. Marla Sandys & Adam Trahan, Life Qualification, Automatic Death
Penalty Voter Status, and Juror Decision Making in Capital Cases, 29 JUST. SYS. J.
385, 386–87 (referring to jurors who refuse to consider life as automatic death pen-
alty voters or “ADPs”).
228. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979), abrogated by Cruz v. New
York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
229. See, e.g., Judith L. Ritter, Your Lips Are Moving . . . but the Words Aren’t
Clear:  Dissecting the Presumption that Jurors Understand Instructions, 69 MO. L.
REV. 163, 164 (2004).
230. State v. Bey, 548 A.2d 887, 906 (N.J. 1988) (citations omitted).
231. A Westlaw KeyCite report reveals that the Supreme Court has decided
at least 60 cases since Furman where capital jury instructions were at issue.
232. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890 (1983).
233. As of 2006, the Third Circuit and U.S. District Courts in Pennsylvania
reversed at least eleven death sentences based on improper jury instructions under
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988).  See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, A Tale of Two Nations: Implementation of the Death Penalty in “Execut-
ing” Versus “Symbolic” States in the United States, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1895–96
& n.166 (2006) (citing Pennsylvania cases).  This number has increased since then.
See, e.g., Steele v. Beard, 830 F. Supp. 2d 49, 94 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (finding that
Pennsylvania’s pattern jury instructions violated Mills).
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Of course, the adoption of “plain language” pattern jury instruc-
tions234 does not ensure that jurors will understand said instruc-
tions.235  Judicial sentencing would eliminate this dilemma.  While it
is true that judges do not always understand or follow the law—
because they are human—it is safe to assume that a judge with legal
training and experience would produce substantially more consis-
tent results than a group of 12 laypeople can.236
2. Crafting a Capital Sentencing Scheme That Better Ensures
Justice and Complies with the Constitution
a. Do as Nebraska Does
The unanimous decision of a jury of laypersons is an ideal to
strive for.  If the conventional wisdom that capital trials are won
and lost in jury selection237 is true, then the natural urge of the de-
fense to pick a stealth juror (a juror who will automatically vote for
life) and the prosecution to pick an ADP (an automatic death pen-
alty voter)238 makes jury selection in capital cases a zero-sum game.
In the ideal criminal justice system, death sentences would require
unanimous jury sentencing, but the current criminal justice system
is not ideal.239  The ideal capital sentencing structure would be com-
posed of a jury finding aggravating circumstances followed by a
panel of three judges issuing a unanimous sentence.  While sentenc-
ing by a single judge is constitutional240—and still preferable to
jury-sentencing—the three-judge system provides a more effective
safeguard against pitfalls of a single judge possessing such author-
234. See, e.g., JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 760–75
(2018).
235. See Amy E. Smith & Craig Haney, Getting to the Point: Attempting to
Improve Juror Comprehension of Capital Penalty Phase Instructions, 35 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 339, 341–32 (2011) (finding that, on a scale of 0 to 16, in a study testing
comprehension of California’s “plain language” capital jury instructions, the mean
score was 8.55 with a high score of 13).
236. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Pow-
ell, & Stevens, JJ.) (describing advantages of judicial sentencing).
237. See Symposium: Probing “Life Qualification” Through Expanded Voir
Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1209, 1209–11 & n.1 (2001).
238. See Sandys & Trahan, supra note 227, at 386–87.
239. Cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555 (2000) (BREYER, J.,
dissenting).
240. See supra Part III.A.
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ity241 while gaining the benefit of a decision by a deliberative body
with judges of different views.242
The provision of Nebraska’s death penalty law addressing the
sentencing determination243 confronts each of these concerns.  In
Nebraska, if a defendant pleads guilty to or is convicted of first de-
gree murder in a case in which the information includes aggravating
circumstances, the trial court must set a date for an aggravation
hearing.244  Unless the defendant waives his right to a jury determi-
nation, the aggravation hearing may be before the jury that found
the defendant guilty,245 or the court may impanel a new jury for the
aggravation hearing.246  The statute codifies an implicit preference
for trying the aggravation hearing with the guilt-phase jury by al-
lowing the jury that found the defendant guilty at trial to consider
evidence presented during the guilt trial as evidence of aggravation,
while allowing a newly impaneled jury to only consider evidence
presented at the aggravation hearing.247  If the jury unanimously
finds one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt,248 the jury is discharged,249 and the court convenes a panel
of three judges for a sentencing hearing to “receive evidence of mit-
igation and sentence excessiveness or disproportionality . . . .”250
The court is prohibited from conducting that hearing until a
presentence investigation is completed.251
241. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of
Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases,
75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 793–94 (1995) (noting that, in states with judicial elections,
jury-overrides in favor of death were more common than jury-overrides in favor of
life). But cf. Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 MO.
L. REV. 751, 758–64 (2009) (criticizing the “merit selection” scheme known as the
“Missouri Plan” as elitist and undemocratic because it bypasses both selection
elections and confirmation by elected bodies).
242. Cf. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obe-
dience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107
YALE L. J. 2155, 2173–74 (1998) (finding that ideologically diverse three-judge ap-
pellate panels moderated the decisions of a panel’s majority).
243. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521 (Cum. Supp. 2018).
244. Id. § 29-2520(1).
245. Id. § 29-2520(2)(a).
246. Id. § 29-2520(2)(b)(i)–(ii).
247. Id. § 29-2520(4)(c).
248. Id. § 2520(4)(f).  The court must issue a sentence of life imprisonment if
the jury is not unanimous as to the existence of any aggravating circumstance or is
unanimous as to the non-existence of aggravating circumstances. Id. § 29-2520(h).
249. Id. § 29-2520(g)
250. Id. § 29-2520(4)(h).
251. Id. § 29-2261(1).  A collateral benefit of a pre-sentence investigation is
that it addresses areas commonly used in mitigation of death sentences, such as the
offender’s mental condition and background. See Penny White, et al., National
Public Defense Symposium: “Unique Ethical Dilemmas in Capital Representation,”
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\124-2\DIK205.txt unknown Seq: 32 29-JAN-20 9:10
494 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:463
Unless he is disqualified,252 the judge who presided over the
conviction presides over the panel for the sentencing hearing.253
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Nebraska chooses the
other two judges on the panel at random.254  During the sentencing
hearing, the defense may present any information the judge deems
relevant to mitigation and sentence excessiveness or disproportion-
ality, and both the state and defense may present arguments for or
against death.255  At the conclusion of the presentation, the panel
determines the sentence.256
A sentence of death may only be imposed upon a unanimous
determination of the sentencing panel.257  The panel’s determina-
tion “shall be based upon the following considerations”:
(1) Whether the aggravating circumstances as determined to ex-
ist justify imposition of a sentence of death;
(2) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which ap-
proach or exceed the weight given to the aggravating circum-
stances; or
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportion-
ate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both
the crime and the defendant.258
7 TENN. J. L. & POL’Y 203, 227–28 (2010).  Failure of defense counsel to ade-
quately investigate relevant mitigating evidence is an unfortunately common mode
of relief for prisoners sentenced to death. See, e.g., Saylor supra note 6, at 29–30
(citing Pennsylvania cases).
252. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521(1)(b).  A well-functioning judicial sentencing
scheme should serve the same function as jury selection.  It should require that
judges are able to apply the law and vote for life or for death.  Ideally, judges
should self-disqualify in cases when they are unable to apply the law based on
personal beliefs. Cf. Bright & Keenan, supra note 241, at 817.  If they do not self-
disqualify, courts should intervene. Accord In re Pulaski Cty. Cir. Ct., No. 17-155,
2017 Ark. LEXIS 154, at *2 (Ark. Apr. 17, 2017) (per curiam) (disqualifying a
judge from future death penalty cases based on his public protests against capital
punishment); see also Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1903 (2016) (con-
cluding that, under a “likelihood of bias” standard, the Chief Justice of Penn-
sylvania should have recused himself from a capital case).  Disqualification
provisions, statutory or otherwise, should not be construed “to require recusal
from the courts of all who have experienced the fullness of life-good and bad” or
“to enable forum shopping by parties to litigation.”  Strickler v. Pruett, Nos. 97-29,
97-30, 1998 WL 340420, at *14 (4th Cir. June 17, 1998) (opinion of Luttig, J.) (de-
clining a disqualification motion in death penalty case triggered by the murder of
the judge’s father by someone who was sentenced to death).
253. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
254. Id.
255. Id. § 29-2521(3).
256. Id.
257. See id. § 29-2522.
258. Id. § 29-2522(1)–(3).
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The panel’s determination must “be in writing and refer to the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances weighed in the determi-
nation of the panel.”259  In Gregg, the plurality endorsed propor-
tionality review, saying that it “substantially eliminates the
possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an
aberrant [sentencer].”260  The Proffitt plurality recognized that a
written judgment “can assure consistency, fairness, and rationality
in the evenhanded operation of the state law.”261
On direct appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court conducts de
novo review of the record regarding sufficiency of the aggravating
circumstance(s), weight given to mitigation, and the proportionality
of the sentence.262  If the Nebraska Supreme Court finds that the
trial court erred by failing to consider a mitigating circumstance or
invalidates an aggravating circumstance, then the court must review
the error to determine if it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
but it cannot reweigh the weighing decision.263  If the error is harm-
less, the defendant is not entitled to relief.264  The combination of
the panel’s written findings and the lack of an anonymously deliber-
ating jury makes a determination of harmless error easier,265  which
in turn lessens the burden on the lower courts.  This is not to sug-
gest that Nebraska’s system is perfect.266
b. Allow the Jury to Make Recommendations as to Weight of
Aggravating Circumstances
An issue with the Nebraska capital sentencing scheme, as well
as that of Montana,267 is that it removes juries from the process as
259. Id. § 29-2522.  For an example of a written sentencing order in a Ne-
braska death penalty case, see State v. Schroeder, No. CR 17-17 (Johnson Cty.,
Dist. Ct., Neb., June 1, 2018), available at https://bit.ly/2SgJ2gO [https://perma.cc/
4A62-2Q89].
260. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell,
& Stevens, JJ.).  However, comparative proportionality review is not constitution-
ally required.  Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 45 (1984).
261. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259–60 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Pow-
ell, & Stevens, JJ.).
262. State v. Galindo, 774 N.W.2d 190, 248 (Neb. 2009).
263. See State v. Sandoval, 788 N.W.2d 172, 215, 222 (Neb. 2010) (citations
omitted).
264. Id. at 215; see also id. at 237 (Connolly, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (accusing the majority opinion of reweighing).
265. Cf. James C. Scoville, Comment, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error in
Capital Sentencing, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 740, 756 (1987) (concluding that harmless
error is inappropriate when juries make the weighing decision).
266. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
267. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 (2017) (providing for sentencing by
the trial judge alone).
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much as is constitutionally permissible.  Although one of the central
tenets of this Comment is that judicial sentencing is preferable to
jury sentencing, a system that takes the life of a capital defendant
should reserve a role for the jury, given the important societal func-
tion juries play.268  Still, the ideal role of a jury is an advisory one—
albeit one entitled to consideration by the trial court as a safeguard
against the worst instincts of judges.  Under the former sentencing
scheme in Alabama, the jury issued an advisory verdict as to both
aggravation and mitigation, which the sentencing judge was re-
quired to consider.269  In Harris v. Alabama,270 the Supreme Court
upheld that provision.271
This Comment proposes a novel system in which a jury would
not provide a recommendation as to mitigation but would rather
assign weight to aggravating circumstances based on some fixed
measure that specifies weight from lowest to highest.  The jury’s
recommendation as to the weight of aggravators should be unani-
mous as to the highest weight that all jurors agree upon.272  When
considering the jury’s recommendation as to the weight of aggrava-
tion, the panel—or lone sentencing judge—should be required to
give such recommendation “great weight.”273  Such would strike the
right balance between the advantages of the Nebraska statute and
the value of the jury in the Anglo-American system.274
IV. CONCLUSION
As this Comment demonstrates, there is substantial disagree-
ment among lower courts as to the extent to which a jury is re-
quired in capital sentencing.  While these courts mostly agree that
the Supreme Court’s decisions do not mandate jury sentencing in
268. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968).
269. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1994), superseded by Act of Apr.11, 2017,
§ 1, 2017 Ala. Acts 231.
270. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995)
271. See id. at 515.  The Supreme Court has never overruled Harris and “the
Eleventh Circuit has continued to apply and accept Harris as settled law.”  Taylor
v. Dunn, No. CV 14-0439-WS-N, 2018 WL 575670, at *67 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 25, 2018)
(citing Madison v. Commissioner, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 677 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th
Cir. 2012)).
272. For example, if ten members of the jury agree that, on a scale of one to
ten—with one being lowest and ten being highest—that the assigned weight of the
aggravating circumstances should be a ten, and two members of the jury believe
the weight should be eight, then the jury’s recommendation as to the weight of an
aggravating circumstance should be eight.
273. Cf. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), abrogated by Hurst v.
Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
274. See supra Part III.B.2.a; Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15
(1968).
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capital cases,275 enough uncertainty remains that clarification is nec-
essary for states like Nebraska and Montana to execute their laws.
There is no use in speculating when—or even if—the court will take
up jury sentencing, but JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR has shown interest in
revisiting the Florida cases decided under the statute Hurst invali-
dated.276  However, given the incoherence of post-Furman death
penalty jurisprudence,277 the author is not optimistic for a satisfac-
tory resolution.
275. See State v. Lotter, 917 N.W.2d 850, 863 & nn.59–60 (Neb. 2018) (citing
state and federal cases).
276. See Reynolds v. Hill, 139 S. Ct. 27, 32 (2018) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
277. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 182 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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